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Admiralty

by Robert S. Glenn, Jr.*
Colin A. McRae**
and Jessica L. McClellan***
I.

INTRODUCTION

The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals handed down ten opinions
distinctly concerning admiralty issues during the 2003 calendar year.
The topics covered in these cases varied from the traditional maritime
issues of allision, cargo, contribution, and admiralty jurisdiction, to the
less common maritime fields of criminal law and state sovereign
immunity. With ten admiralty opinions in 2003, the Eleventh Circuit
has maintained its status as one of the busiest admiralty circuits.
II.

ALLISION

In Sunderland Marine Mutual Insurance Co. v. Weeks Marine

Construction Co.,' the Eleventh Circuit was asked to determine when
a stationary vessel involved in an allision is considered a "moored" vessel
and when it is an "anchored" vessel in order to identify the applicable
set of safety regulations. 2 Sunderland Marine addressed the allision

* Partner in the firm of Hunter, Maclean, Exley & Dunn, P.C., Savannah, Georgia.
Princeton University (A.B., magna cum laude, 1972); University of Georgia (J.D., 1976).
Certification as a mediator by Association of Attorney Mediators, Inc. (1993). Member,
Savannah and American Bar Associations; State Bar of Georgia; Maritime Law Association
of the United States; Southeastern Admiralty Law Institute (Chairman, 1986).
** Associate in the firm of Hunter, Maclean, Exley & Dunn, P.C., Savannah, Georgia.
Yale University (B.A., 1995); University of Georgia (J.D., cum laude, 1999). Member,
Savannah and American Bar Associations; State Bar of Georgia; Maritime Law Association
of the United States; Southeastern Admiralty Law Institute.
*** Associate in the firm of Hunter, Maclean, Exley & Dunn, P.C., Savannah, Georgia.
University of Georgia (B.A., summa cum laude, 2000; J.D., cum laude, 2003). Member, Phi
Beta Kappa. Member, Savannah and American Bar Associations; State Bar of Georgia.
1. 338 F.3d 1276 (11th Cir. 2003).
2. Id. at 1277.
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of two vessels during a heavy fog in the Florida Keys. A shrimp boat
was headed out to sea for a fishing trip when it set an incorrect course
that took it outside the Edmont Key Channel. Unfortunately, the
appellant, Weeks Marine Construction Company ("Weeks Marine"), had
tied one of its barges to a mooring buoy in the same area where Weeks
Marine was performing dredging work. The shrimp boat allided with
Weeks Marine's unlit barge, causing the shrimp boat to sink. The
District Court for the Middle District of Florida found both parties
negligent and apportioned the damages accordingly. Weeks Marine
appealed the district court's finding that its stationary barge was
partially at fault in the allision.3
The central issue on appeal was whether the unlit barge was moored
or anchored for the purpose of determining which navigational rules
applied at the time of the allision.4 The court of appeals went to great
lengths to determine the proper characterization of the barge at the time
of the allision because "[tihe safety requirements for an anchored vessel
S.. are generally higher, for its presence is in unexpected places."5 The
court initially resorted to the use of dictionary definitions by noting that
"[t]he traditional distinguishing factor of a moored vessel versus an
anchored vessel has been that the former is moored to a permanent
object such as a dock or a pier while the anchored vessel is anchored in
open water."6 The difficulty in determining whether the vessel was
moored or anchored in this case lay in the fact that the vessel had been
made fast to a mooring buoy using its mooring lines, while the mooring
buoy was anchored to the ocean bottom.7 Appellant argued that its
barge should be considered a moored vessel because it had been secured
to a mooring buoy via mooring lines. 8 The court responded by stating
that the barge "was not connected to a permanent location, such as a
dock or a pier, but was located in open water, similar to a traditionally
anchored vessel."9 The court ultimately relied on a United States Coast
Guard clarification of this debatable question: "'The interpretive rules
are added to insure that the term vessels at anchor in Rule 30 of the
and the Inland Rules includes vessels moored to a mooring
COLREGS
10
buoy.'

3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 1278 (citing Self Towing, Inc. v. Brown Marine Serv., Inc., 837 F.2d 1501,
1505 (11th Cir. 1988)).
6. Id. at 1277 (citing THE OXFORD COMPANION To SHIPS AND THE SEA 559 (1988)).
7. Id. at 1277-78.
8. Id. at 1276.
9. Id. at 1278.
10. Id. (quoting 63 F.R. 5728, 5729).
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After determining that the Weeks Marine barge had been a "vessel at
anchor" at the time of the allision, the Eleventh Circuit examined the
safety regulations that apply to such a vessel. 1 The court noted that
lighting,
and
thp Weeks Mnrine hnag was
xound,volaing eated-a
12
navigational obstruction rules at the time of the allision. The opinion
states the general rule that the presumption of fault for an allision lies
with the moving vessel, which in this case was the shrimp boat. 3
However, the burden of proof shifts to the stationary vessel when the
stationary vessel is in violation of a statutory rule intended to prevent
Weeks Marine failed to meet its burden under the
accidents. 4
Pennsylvania rule requiring proof that the navigation rule violations by
the barge did not contribute in any way to the allision, and thus, the
court ruled that the district court was correct in finding Weeks Marine
partially at fault for the allision. 5 As a final note, the court of appeals
awarded pre-judgment interest and made the pronouncement that "[t]he
rate of pre-judgment interest6 that should be awarded is the prime rate
during the relevant period."'

III.

STATE SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY

The central issue in Vierling v. Celebrity Cruises, Inc. 7 was the right
of a state port authority to assert Eleventh Amendment immunity'"
Plaintiff John Vierling was a would-be passenger on the M/V CENTURY,
a cruise ship owned by Celebrity Cruises, Inc. ("Celebrity"). The MIV
CENTURY was secured to a Port Everglades, Florida pier that was
owned and operated by the Port Everglades Port Authority (the "Port
Authority"), a department of Broward County, Florida. The Port
Authority had an arrangement with Celebrity to provide passenger

11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 1279 (citing Bunge Corp. v. M/V Furness Bridge, 558 F.2d 790, 795 (5th Cir.
1977)).
14. Id. The opinion further states that under the longstanding Pennsylvania rule, the
stationary vessel then bears the burden of showing that its statutory violation could not
have been a contributory cause of the allision. Id. (citing The Pennsylvania, 86 U.S. 125,
136 (1873)).
15. Id. at 1279-80. The apportionment of damages between the parties resulted from
the district court's finding that the captain of appellees' shrimp boat, who had a trace of
cocaine in his system, had negligently set the boat's course in the fog using an incorrect
marker, which contributed to the allision. Id. at 1277.
16. Id. at 1280 (citing First Nat'l Bank of Chicago v. Standard Bank & Trust, 172 F.3d
472, 480 (7th Cir. 1999); The Ohio River Co. v. Peavey Co., 731 F.2d 547, 549 (8th Cir.
1984)).
17. 339 F.3d 1309 (11th Cir. 2003).
18. Id. at 1313.
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loading services to Celebrity's cruise ships on a per-passenger fee basis.
Pursuant to this agreement, a Port Authority employee would position
a bridge from the pier in such a way that a gangway would be extended
onto the ship to allow for the embarkation of Celebrity passengers. On
the morning of September 21, 1996, the M/V CENTURY experienced
inclement weather during the passenger loading process, with wind
gusts up to fifteen to twenty knots. As plaintiff traversed the bridge and
gangway, a sudden gust of wind pushed the ship away from the dock,
causing the gangway to pull away from the ship. Plaintiff fell from the
gangway, slammed into the side of the ship, and fell approximately
forty-five feet into the water below.'9
Plaintiff Vierling filed suit against both Celebrity and the Port
Authority to recover damages for the injuries he sustained in the fall.
Celebrity then cross-claimed against the Port Authority, seeking
indemnification for damages if Celebrity had to pay Vierling. Celebrity's
indemnity action sounded in both negligence, for failure to exercise due
care during loading, and in contract, for breach of the Port Authority's
implied warranty of workmanlike performance. The Port Authority
responded with a motion to dismiss both the complaint and the crossclaim on the basis of Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity. The
district court denied the Port Authority's motions to dismiss on sovereign
immunity grounds, and the Port Authority appealed.2 °
The court of appeals was required to determine whether the Port
Everglades Port Authority was a state agency or instrumentality which
could invoke sovereign immunity.2' The court focused on three factors
in deciding the question: "(1) how state law defines the entity; (2) what
degree of control the state maintains over the entity; and (3) from where
the entity derives its funds and who is responsible for satisfying the
judgments against the entity."22 First, the court noted that Florida law
treats the Port Everglades Port Authority as an entity of the county and
not of the state.23 Second, the court determined that the State of
Florida had no control over the operation of the Port Everglades facilities
because Florida statutory law provides that the county, as the owner of
the Port Authority facility, has the authority to operate and manage the

19. Id. at 1310-11.
20. Id. at 1311-12.
21. Id. at 1313.
22. Id. at 1314 (citing Shands Teaching Hosp. & Clinics, Inc. v. Beech Street Corp., 208
F.3d 1308, 1311 (11th Cir. 2000)).
23. Id. at 1314-15 (citing Mt. Healthy City Bd.of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 280
(1977) (holding that Eleventh Amendment immunity does not extend to counties)).
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facility and to charge fees for its use. 24 Third, the court stated that the
Port Authority is a self-sufficient enterprise that runs its operations on
the revenues it generates with no financial support from the state.25
Based on these three findings, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district
court's ruling that the Port Everglades Port Authority is not an arm26of
the state and therefore was not entitled to sovereign immunity.
After that determination, the court ruled that Celebrity was entitled
to
2 7
proceed with its claim for indemnification from the Port Authority.
IV. CARGO
In A.I.G. Uruguay Compania de Seguros, S.A. v. AAA Cooper
Transportation,5 the Eleventh Circuit examined the "sealed container
doctrine" and the shifting burden of proof in cases involving this
defense. 29 Plaintiff shipped three shrink-wrapped pallets of cellular
phones from Illinois with an intended destination of Uruguay. While en
route from Illinois to Miami, Florida, where the pallets were to be loaded
onto an ocean-going vessel, defendant, common carrier AAA Cooper
Transportation ("Cooper"), unloaded the shipment from its truck and
loaded it into a storage trailer for the weekend. When Cooper's driver
returned to pick up the shipment, he discovered that the cellular phones
had disappeared from the shipment. 30
The United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida
conducted a bench trial and determined that plaintiff had made out a
prima facie case against Cooper.3 1 The court awarded plaintiff a total
of $126,000 for the lost cargo. On appeal, Cooper argued that the
district court improperly allowed plaintiff to establish its prima facie
case by using circumstantial evidence rather than direct evidence, as is

24. Id. at 1315 (citing FLA. STAT. ch. 125.012 (2000)).
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 1320.
28. 334 F.3d 997 (11th Cir. 2003).
29. Id. at 1002. AIG Uruguay arose in the context of an overland shipment of cargo,
to which the Carmack Amendment of the Interstate Commerce Act applies. 49 U.S.C.
§ 14706 (2000). However, the court of appeals stated that courts should apply the same
analysis to all sealed containers, whether shipped by land or by sea. AIG Uruguay, 334
F.3d at 1006. The analysis undertaken by the court in AG Uruguay is therefore applicable
with equal force to cases involving ocean-going transportation of containerized cargo, and
thus bears significance for admiralty practitioners in this circuit.
30. 334 F.3d at 1002-03.
31. Id. at 1003. AIG Uruguay Compania de Seguros was the cargo insurer for the lost
phones and sued Cooper as subrogee after paying the shipper's claim for loss of the phones.

Id.
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required under the sealed container doctrine.32 Under the sealed
container doctrine, when the cargo at issue is shipped in a sealed
container, "the carrier has no... ability to ascertain the contents of the
shipment, and [thus,] the shipper is held to a higher standard of proof'
in establishing its prima facie case. 3 The appellate court concluded
that under this higher standard of proof, plaintiff shipper cannot rely on
the bill of lading alone to prove the condition of the cargo at the time of
delivery to the carrier, but instead must supplement this documentary
evidence with some form of direct evidence as to the contents of the
sealed container.3 4
V.

MARITIME CRIMINAL LAW

The Eleventh Circuit decided two cases in 2003 concerning the
Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act ("MDLEA"). 35 In the first case,
United States v. Rendon,3 6 the court dealt with the issue of enhanced
sentencing imposed under the United States Sentencing Guidelines upon
a defendant who acts as a "captain" of a vessel used to transport illegal
drugs into the United States. 7 In the second case, United States v.
McPhee,3 8 the Eleventh Circuit was called upon to decide when, under
the Act, a vessel is subject to the jurisdiction of the United States
courts.

A.

39

United States v. Rendon

Defendant, Geovanni Rendon, was detained by United States Coast
Guard personnel after a high-speed chase in the eastern Pacific Ocean
on May 11, 2001. A Navy surveillance plane spotted defendant's "gofast" vessel and relayed this information to both a Coast Guard
helicopter and a rigged hull inflatable boat launched from a Coast Guard
vessel.4 When the Coast Guard personnel intercepted and boarded the
go-fast boat, defendant identified himself as the captain and stated that

32. Id.
33. Id. at 1004.
34. Id. (citing Highlands Ins. Co. v. Strachan Shipping Co., 772 F.2d 1520, 1521 (11th
Cir. 1985)).
35. 46 U.S.C. app. §§ 1901-04 (2004).
36. 354 F.3d 1320 (11th Cir. 2003).
37. Id. at 1329-31.
38. 336 F.3d 1269 (11th Cir. 2003).
39. Id. at 1272-78.
40. 354 F.3d at 1322-24. Such vessels are " ' refer[red] to as "go-fast" boats because they
can travel at high rates of speed, which makes them a favored vehicle for drug and alien
smuggling operations.'" Id. at 1322 n.1 (quoting United States v. Tinoco, 304 F.3d 1088,
1092 (11th Cir. 2002)).
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the boat was registered in Colombia. After consulting with Colombian
officials who were unable to confirm the claim of registry, the Coast
Guard searched the vessel and found traces of cocaine in the forward
compartment of the boat. Soon thereafter, the Coast Guard agents
returned to the area where they had observed the crew of the go-fast
boat dumping bales overboard during the high-speed pursuit. The
agents recovered forty-eight bales of cocaine with a net weight of 1,171
kilograms. 4' Defendant was charged with conspiracy to distribute and
possession with intent to distribute five kilograms or more of cocaine, in
violation of §§ 1903(a),(g), and (j) of the MDLEA.4' Defendant pleaded
guilty, without a plea agreement, and was sentenced. Defendant was
subject to a mandatory minimum imprisonment term of ten years on
each count of the indictment. He was given upward adjustments under
the Sentencing Guidelines for being both the captain of the boat and the
organizer or leader of the conspiracy; therefore, he was sentenced to
concurrent terms of 360 months.43
On appeal, Rendon argued that the district court erred by giving him
upward adjustments for being both the captain of the boat, and the
organizer and leader of the conspiracy. 44 Rendon was given a two-level
increase for being the captain of the boat 45 and a four-level increase for
serving as the organizer or leader of the drug smuggling operation.4 6
Defendant argued that these two separate enhancements were based on
the same conduct and therefore constituted impermissible "double
The court of appeals determined that Rendon was the
counting. " 4
captain because he identified himself as such when Coast Guard

41.

Id. at 1322-23.

42. 46 U.S.C. app. § 1903 (2000).
43. 354 F.3d at 1323-24.
44. Id. at 1324. Defendant also raised the issue of the court's jurisdiction in the case,
but the court noted that these same jurisdictional and constitutional challenges to the
MDLEA had been raised and dealt with by the court in United States v. Tinoco, 304 F.3d
1088 (11th Cir. 2002). Id. at 1324-28. The Eleventh Circuit also rejected Rendon's
argument that his sentence was improper in light of the Supreme Court case of Apprendi
v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000). Id. at 1328. Because Rendon's sentence was the
mandatory minimum and not above the statutory maximum, his Apprendi argument was
.unavailing." Id.
45. Id. at 1328 (citing UNITED STATES SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2D1.1(b)(2)(B) (2001)).
46. Id. (citing UNITED STATES SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3B1.1(a) (2001)).
47. Id. "'Impermissible double counting occurs ... when one part of the [Sentencing]
Guidelines is applied to increase a defendant's punishment on account of a kind of harm
that has already been fully accounted for by application of another part of the
Guidelines.'" Id. at 1333 (quoting United States v. Rodriguez-Matos, 188 F.3d 1300, 1309
(llth Cir. 1999)).
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personnel boarded the vessel.48
Rendon's co-defendants further
testified that they considered him to be the captain, that he was the only
crew member who knew the course to be taken, and that he hired the
crew and directed their operations while on board.49 The court stated
that enhancement of Rendon's sentence for serving as the organizer or
leader was based on separate and independent evidence that Rendon
had instructed at least eight people involved in the conspiracy, which is
well more than the "five or more participants" required under § 3B1. 1(a)
of the Sentencing Guidelines to trigger this enchancement.5 ° The court
reasoned that the factors used in these two sentence enhancements were
not subsets of each other, and thus, Rendon was not sentenced using
impermissible double counting. 1
Therefore, the court of appeals
affirmed Rendon's conviction and sentence.52
B.

United States u. McPhee

Defendant in United States v. McPhee 3 raised a novel challenge to
the "territorial waters" prong of the court's elements ofjurisdiction under
the MDLEA, but his conviction was ultimately upheld by the Eleventh
Circuit.54 Defendant was convicted of conspiracy to possess with intent
to distribute one hundred kilograms or more of marijuana and was given
a fifty-seven month sentence. Although he entered a conditional plea of
guilty, defendant expressly reserved the right to appeal the denial of his
motion to dismiss the indictment under Federal Rule of Criminal
Procedure 11(a)(2) based on subject matter jurisdiction.5 5 Defendant's
pretrial motion to dismiss the indictment centered around the argument
that the vessel he was in at the time of his arrest, the NOTTY, was
located within the territorial waters of a foreign nation, the Bahamas,
which does not consent to enforcement of the MDLEA by the United States.5"

48. Id. at 1329.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 1334.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. 336 F.3d 1269 (11th Cir. 2003).
54. Id. at 1278.
55. Id. at 1271. Under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure Rule 11(a)(2), a defendant
may, with the consent of the court and the government, enter a conditional plea of guilty
and reserve in writing the right to have an appellate court review an adverse determination of a pre-trial motion. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(a)(2).
56. 336 F.3d at 1273. In McPhee the court ultimately determined that it was not
necessary to decide the question of whether the Bahamas had consented to enforcement
of the MDLEA because United States courts would have jurisdiction over the vessel as a
"vessel without nationality" under § 1903(c)(1)(A) and as a "vessel aboard which the master
or person in charge makes a claim of registry, which claim is denied by the flag nation
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In McPhee the court began by noting that the standard of review of a
district court's application of statutory provisions concerning subject
matter jurisdiction is de novo, and, therefore, it would review for clear
C.
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In deciding the question of jurisdiction, the court stated that "[tihe
United States generally recognizes the territorial seas of foreign nations
up to twelve nautical miles adjacent to recognized foreign coasts.""8
After an initial evidentiary dispute over the position of the vessel at the
time of its seizure, McPhee argued that even accepting the navigation
chart position offered by the government, the NOTTY was within twelve
miles of a point off the coast of the Bahamas called "Saint Vincent Rock"
and therefore was within Bahamian territorial waters.5 9 The district
court concluded that Saint Vincent Rock did not constitute an island for
60
purposes of measuring the Bahamas' twelve-mile territorial limit.
The court of appeals reviewed this finding of fact for clear error.6"
After first undergoing a somewhat whimsical analysis of the lyrics of the
Simon & Garfunkel song "I Am a Rock,"62 the court noted that Saint
Vincent Rock is normally a submerged rock and does not qualify as
land.6 3 The court then looked to the 1993 Archipelagic Waters &
Maritime Jurisdiction Act 4 of the Bahamas to determine the applicable
definition of "island."65 The court determined that Saint Vincent Rock
did not meet the definition of "island" under the Archipelagic Act's "high
water elevation" or "low tide elevation" definitions.'
In conclusion, the court took notice of the applicable navigation charts,
which indicate the presence of Saint Vincent Rock as a "dangerous
underwater rock of uncertain depth."67 Because Saint Vincent Rock
was to be considered a rock and not an island, the position of the

whose registry is claimed" under § 1903(c)(2)(A). Id. at 1273 & n.4. The occupants of the
NOTTY claimed that the vessel was registered in the Bahamas, yet the Bahamian
authorities could not provide confirmation of the registry. Id. at 1271.
57. Id. at 1271 (citing Tinoco, 304 F.3d at 1114).
58. Id. at 1273 (citing Proclamation No. 5030, 22 I.L.M. 461 (Mar. 10, 1983)).
59. Id. at 1275-76.
60. Id. at 1276.
61. Id. at 1277.
62. Id. at 1276 n.9 (citing PAUL SIMON & ART GARFUNKEL, IAm A Rock, on SOUNDS OF
SILENCE (Columbia Records 1966)). The court stated that "in the metaphysical sense, [it
could] discern no reason why something could not be both a rock and an island at the same
time." Id.
63. Id. at 1277.
64. 22 U.S.C. § 2291 (2000).
65. 336 F.3d at 1277.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 1278.
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NOTTY at the time of its seizure was not within Bahamian territorial
waters but was instead in international waters, and thus, the district
court had jurisdiction over defendant's case.68
VI.

JURISDICTION

In Anderson v. United States,69 the Eleventh Circuit examined
whether an employee's personal injury claim arose in admiralty, and if
so, whether the employee had complied with the jurisdictional requirements of the Extension of Admiralty Jurisdiction Act ("EAJA").70
Plaintiff, Anderson, was a civilian employee of a United States contractor. The contractor was located at a weapons training facility. An
armed aircraft released two bombs at the weapons training facility
range. The bombs missed the intended target and impacted near the
observation post on the weapons training facility range injuring
Anderson. Anderson's claim to the Naval Legal Services Office was
denied, and thereafter, Anderson filed a complaint in the district court
under the Federal Tort Claims Act ("FTCA"),7 ' and, alternatively,
under the Suits in Admiralty Act ("SAA"),7 2 the Public Vessels Act
("PVA"),73 and the EAJA.74 In each claim, plaintiff alleged that the
United States negligently failed to provide a safe working environment
by causing two bombs to be dropped near his work site, which resulted
in physical and mental injuries. The United States filed a motion to
dismiss challenging the basis of subject matter jurisdiction, and the
district court granted the motion and dismissed with prejudice.75
On appeal the Eleventh Circuit considered whether Anderson's claim
fell within admiralty jurisdiction.76
The court explained that if
admiralty jurisdiction existed for plaintiff's claim, the claim could not be
brought under the FTCA.77 The Eleventh Circuit discussed the two
tests enunciated by the United States Supreme Court in Jerome B.
Grubart,Inc. v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co.78:

68. Id.
69. 317 F.3d 1235 (11th Cir. 2003).
70. Id. at 1239-40; see 46 U.S.C. § 740 (2000).
71. 28 U.S.C. § 2680 (2000).
72. 46 U.S.C. §§ 741-752 (2000).
73. 46 U.S.C. §§ 781-790 (2000).
74. 46 U.S.C. § 740 (2000).
75. Anderson, 317 F.3d at 1236.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 1237.
78. 513 U.S. 527 (1995).
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Under the location test, where a court must determine whether the tort
occurred on navigable water or whether [the] injury suffered on land
was caused by a vessel on navigable water [and under] the connection
test, a courtOj first, must assess the general features of the type of
incident involved to determine whether the incident has a potentially
disruptive impact on maritime commerce[, and second,] a court must
determine whether the general character of the activity giving rise to
the incident
shows a substantial relationship to traditional maritime
79
activity.

The Eleventh Circuit held that the aircraft was on an appurtenance of
the ship at the time of plaintiff's injuries, and because injuries caused
by an appurtenance to a vessel are deemed to have been caused by the
vessel, the court concluded that the location test was satisfied.8 0 The
Eleventh Circuit also held that the connection test was satisfied because
the range had a potential to disrupt maritime commerce and the vessel's
activities showed a substantial relationship to traditional maritime
activity."' Because Anderson's injuries were caused by the vessel and
were connected to maritime activity, the Eleventh Circuit held that his
claim arose
in admiralty and therefore could not be brought under the
82
FTCA.
After determining that Anderson's claim arose in admiralty, the
Eleventh Circuit discussed the plaintiff's requirements under the EAJA:
(1) filing an administrative claim with the federal agency owning or
operating the vessel causing the injury or damage and (2) waiting six
months after filing an administrative claim before filing suit against the
United States. 3 The Eleventh Circuit strictly construed the EAJA's
jurisdictional requirements, holding that Anderson was required to wait
six months to file his suit against the United States after his personal
injury claim was denied even though the two-year limitation period had
expired for a negligence claim under the PVA and the SAA. s"
VII.

MARITIME CONTRACT

In Merrill Stevens Dry Dock Co. v. MIV Yeocomico 11,85 the Eleventh
Circuit addressed the enforceability of limited liability clauses in a

79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.

Anderson, 317 F.3d at 1237 (quoting Grubart,513 U.S. at 534).
Id. at 1238.
Id.
Id. at 1239.
Id. at 1239-40. See 46 U.S.C. § 740 (2000).
Anderson, 317 F.3d at 1240.
329 F.3d 809 (llth Cir. 2003).
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contract for ship repair.8 6 In this case, YII Shipping contracted with
Merrill Stevens for repairs to its ship, M/V YII. The repairs were
necessary to bring the ship into compliance with United States Coast
Guard regulations. The contract contained exculpatory clauses. Some
time after the contract was signed and the repair work had commenced,
a fire occurred as a result of the negligence of two of Merrill Stevens's
workers who were performing welding work. The fire damaged the
ship's accommodations house, and it took an additional eight weeks to
repair the damage. While M/V YII was out of service, YII Shipping
claimed that it lost certain shipping routes to its competitors and that
it could not reclaim these routes when the repairs were completed."7
Merrill Stevens sued YII Shipping, claiming that it failed to pay the
balance for the repair work that Merrill Stevens completed. Merrill
Stevens also sued for prejudgment interest of eighteen percent as
provided in the contract. Merrill Stevens claimed that paragraphs in the
contract precluded YII Shipping's recovery for incidental and consequential damages. In response, YII Shipping claimed that the contract terms
were void because Merrill Stevens had breached the contract by
negligently setting fire to the ship. YII Shipping also claimed that the
limited liability clauses of the contract were ambiguous and thus
unenforceable. Additionally, YII Shipping filed a counterclaim for the
fire damage to the ship, lost profits sustained while the ship underwent
an additional eight weeks of repair, and lost profits sustained after the
ship returned to service. The district court found that the fire was
caused by Merrill Stevens's negligence and awarded YII Shipping
damages for the fire damage and also for damages resulting from the
loss of use. The district court, however, denied YII Shipping's claim for
lost profits. Merrill Stevens was awarded prejudgment interest of
eighteen percent. Both parties moved for reconsideration and amendment. Upon reconsideration, the district court amended its order in
part, finding that the limited liability clauses in the contract were
ambiguous and thus unenforceable.8 8
On appeal, four issues were presented: (1) whether the contract was
ambiguous and thus unenforceable; (2) whether the district court erred
in awarding YII Shipping damages for the fire damage and for the loss
of use of the ship during the eight weeks of repair; (3) whether the
district court erroneously failed to award YII Shipping damages for lost
profits; and (4) whether it erred in awarding Merrill Stevens prejudg-

86.
87.
88.

Id. at 813-16.
Id. at 811-13.
Id.
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ment interest.8 9 The Eleventh Circuit reviewed de novo whether the
contract was ambiguous.9" The court explained that a limited liability
clause is enforceable if it satisfies the three part test set forth in Diesel
"Repower" Inc. v. Islander investments Ltd.
First, the "ciause must
'clearly and unequivocally indicate the parties' intention.' 9 2 "Second,
'the limitation must not absolve the repairer of all liability and must...
provide a deterrent to negligence."' 93 Finally,
"the parties [to] the
94
contract must have 'equal bargaining power.'
In Merrill Stevens the Eleventh Circuit explained that there was no
allegation as to the second and third steps, and therefore, the court only
had to address the first step of the test to determine whether the limited
liability clauses of the contract were unambiguous and thus enforceable.9 5 The court explained that the question of whether a contract is
ambiguous is one of law for the court to determine.96 In deciding this,
"'a contractual provision should not be construed as being in conflict
with another unless no other reasonable interpretation is possible."' 97
Upon examining the limited liability clauses of the contract at issue, the
Eleventh Circuit concluded that the clauses were unambiguous,
reversing the district court's finding that the clauses were ambiguous. 9
Accordingly, YII Shipping was entitled to recover incidental or consequential damages resulting from Merrill Stevens's negligence.9 9 The
Eleventh Circuit affirmed the holdings of the district court on the
remaining issues of damages and prejudgment interest. 1°'

VIII.

ADMIRALTY PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE

In Velchez v. Carnival Corp.,10 the Eleventh Circuit dismissed an
appeal, holding that it lacked jurisdiction under the removal statute to
review a remand order based on plaintiff's motion to remand for a

89. Id. at 813.
90. Id.
91. Id. (citing Diesel "Repower" Inc. v. Islander Investments Ltd., 271 F.3d 1318 (11th
Cir. 2001)).

92. Id. (quoting Diesel "Repower," 271 F.3d at 1324).
93. Id. (quoting Diesel "Repower," 271 F.3d at 1324).
94. Id. (quoting Diesel "Repower," 271 F.3d at 1324).
95. Id. at 813-14.
96. Id. at 814.
97. Id. (quoting Maccaferri Gabions, Inc. v. Dynateria, Inc., 91 F.3d 1431, 1440 (11th
Cir. 1996)).
98. Id.
99. Id. at 814-15.

100.

Id. at 815-17.

101.

331 F.3d 1207 (11th Cir. 2003).
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procedural defect.0 2 Plaintiff Velchez was a seaman onboard a vessel
owned by defendant Carnival. Plaintiff sued Carnival in state court
asserting claims for Jones Act' negligence, unseaworthiness, failure
to provide maintenance and cure, and failure to treat. 10 4 Approximately nineteen months after plaintiff filed suit, Carnival filed a notice of
removal to the district court, asserting that because plaintiff was
working under an arbitration agreement, removal was proper under 9
U.S.C. § 205.105 Following removal, plaintiff moved for the district
court to remand the action to the state court, arguing that Carnival's
notice of removal was procedurally flawed. The district court agreed and
granted Velchez's motion. 10 6
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit noted that "'an order remanding a
case to the [sitate court from which it was removed is not reviewable on
appeal or otherwise.' '1°7 Plaintiffs amended motion for remand
asserted that defendant failed to meet the procedural requirements of 28
U.S.C. § 1446108 because Carnival failed to attach a copy of all process,
pleadings, and orders served as required by the statute.'0 9 This failure
to comply with the statute constituted a defect in the removal procedure
within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c)," 0 and plaintiff's motion
was timely, based on the procedural defects of the removal."'
The Eleventh Circuit concluded that it lacked jurisdiction over the
appeal." 2 Carnival contended that the district court acted on its own
to send the case back to the state court because the procedural defect
used to remand the case was different from the procedural defect
specified by plaintiff."'
The Eleventh Circuit explained that the
appeal turned on whether a remand order based on a procedural defect
other than the one asserted by a party in the remand motion amounted
to a sua sponte order over which the Eleventh Circuit had jurisdiction. 114 The court held that the Black's Law Dictionary definition of

102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.

Id. at 1210.
42 U.S.C. app. § 688 (2000).
Velchez, 331 F.3d at 1208.
9 U.S.C. § 205 (2000).
Velchez, 331 F.3d at 1208.
Id. at 1208 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d) (2000)).
28 U.S.C. § 1446 (2000).
331 F.3d at 1208.
28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) (2000).

111. 331 F.3d at 1208-09.
112. Id. at 1209.
113. Id. at 1209-10.
114. Id. at 1210.
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sua sponte, "without prompting or suggestion; on its own motion,"115
did not fit the circumstances of the case, because the court was prompted
to remand
by plaintiff.11
The court therefore dismissed the ap7
2
peali_
IX.

CONTRIBUTION

Murphy v. Florida Keys Electric Cooperative Ass'n 8 clarified the
Eleventh Circuit's muddled history on whether a defendant in an
admiralty tort action, who settled with a plaintiff without obtaining a
release from liability for other potential defendants, could then be
entitled to contribution from the other defendants. 9 In Murphy
plaintiffs were the parents of Brendan and Steven Murphy, who were on
a boat trip with a friend, Raymond Ashman IV, when their boat alluded
with an electrical pole abutment support structure owned by defendant.
Brendan Murphy was thrown from the boat and killed, and the other
two passengers were injured. The Murphys sued defendant in federal
district court for the wrongful death of Brendan and for Steven's
injuries. Their complaint invoked the court's admiralty jurisdiction and
defendant filed a third-party complaint against the Ashmans, invoking
the court's admiralty jurisdiction. In response, the Ashmans filed a
counterclaim against Florida Keys Electric Cooperative, defendant, to
recover for Raymond's injuries. The Ashmans brought their counterclaim as a civil action under the district court's supplemental jurisdiction
rather than under its admiralty jurisdiction. 20
While all of these actions were pending, Florida Keys settled with the
Murphys. However, the settlement agreement did not release the
Ashmans from liability to the Murphys. As a result, the Ashmans
moved for summary judgment on defendant's third-party contribution
claim, which the district court granted. The district court also exercised
its discretionary powers and dismissed without prejudice the Ashmans'
counterclaim against Florida Keys. Defendant appealed both the grant
of summary judgment on its contribution claim and the dismissal
without prejudice of its counterclaim. 21
In affirming the district court, the Eleventh Circuit examined its prior
decisions on contribution in admiralty cases, which it noted "have

115. Id. (quoting BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1437 (7th ed. 1999).
116. Id.
117.

Id.

118. 329 F.3d 1311 (11th Cir. 2003).
119. Id. at 1312-13.
120. Id. at 1313.
121. Id. at 1313-14.
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lurched back and forth like a drunken sailor."122 The Eleventh Circuit
followed the United States Supreme Court decision in McDermott, Inc.
v. AmClyde,"2 ' together with the Eleventh Circuit's decision in Jovovich v. Desco Marine, Inc.,124 concluding that a settling defendant could
not bring a suit for contribution against a nonsettling defendant who
was not released from liability to the plaintiff by the settlement agreement. 2' According to the court, the "proportionate share approach"
applied.'2 6 Under this approach,
if at least one defendant does not settle with the plaintiff and the case
goes to trial, the amount of damages and the percentage of liability
attributable to each tortfeasor is determined at trial, and any nonsettling defendant is responsible for only27the proportion of the total
damages attributed to it in the verdict. 1
Using the proportionate share approach, rather than the pro-tanto
approach, 28 the Eleventh Circuit held that a settling defendant could not
unreleased defendants for contribution in admiralty tort
sue nonsettling,
29
cases. 1
The appeal also concerned the Ashmans' counterclaim against
defendant, Florida Keys, which was brought under the district court's
supplemental jurisdiction, rather than its admiralty jurisdiction.
Defendant, wishing to stay in federal court, argued that the counterclaim could have been asserted only under the district court's admiralty
jurisdiction, and therefore dismissal was an abuse of discretion. 3 ' The
Eleventh Circuit disagreed and explained that once defendants filed the
third-party complaint against the Ashmans in federal court, the
maritime tort claim became a compulsory counterclaim because it arose
from the same transaction or occurrence, the boating accident, as
defendant's third-party complaint against the Ashmans for contribu-

122. Id. at 1313.
123. 511 U.S. 202 (1994).
124. 809 F.2d 1529 (11th Cir. 1987).
125. Murphy, 329 F.3d at 1315-16.
126. Id. at 1314. The proportionate-share approach was adopted by the United States
Supreme Court in McDermott, and all circuits presently operate under this approach. See
generally McDermott, Inc. v. AmClyde, 511 U.S. 202 (1994).
127. Murphy, 329 F.3d at 1314 (citing McDermott, 511 U.S. at 208-13).
128. Under the pro-tanto approach, a nonsettling defendant is liable for the entire
amount of the plaintiffs damages, less a set-off for the amount of the other tortfeasors'
settlement, regardless of the proportion of the plaintiffs damages attributable to each
tortfeasor.
129. Murphy, 329 F.3d at 1318.
130. Id. at 1318-19.
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tion.13 ' The court explained that the Ashmans were not required to
bring their maritime tort claim under the district court's admiralty
jurisdiction because, as a compulsory counterclaim, their maritime tort
claim was within the district court's supplemental jurisdiction.'"'
Because the Ashmans did not include a statement invoking the district
court's admiralty jurisdiction, their maritime tort claim was brought as
a civil action under the district court's supplemental jurisdiction
and the
133
district court had discretion to dismiss the counterclaim.
X.

WRONGFUL DEATH

The Eleventh Circuit examined the issue of whether a non-dependent
parent could recover loss of society damages for the wrongful death of
his minor child under general maritime law in Tucker v. Fearn."'
Plaintiff Tucker appealed from the district court's order precluding him
from recovering loss of society damages in his wrongful death action
under the general maritime law. Tucker's son died as a result of a
boating collision which occurred in territorial waters, and Tucker sought
to recover nonpecuniary damages under general maritime law.
Defendants moved to strike Tucker's general maritime claim for
nonpecuniary damages because he was not financially dependent on his
deceased minor son. '35 The district court certified that its order
concerned a controlling question of law as to which there was substantial
ground for difference of opinion, and the13 6 Eleventh Circuit granted
plaintiff's petition for interlocutory review.
In analyzing whether a non-dependent parent may recover loss of
society damages for the wrongful death of his minor child under general
maritime law, the Eleventh Circuit looked to three Supreme Court
cases. 137 First, in Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc. 13 the Supreme Court created a wrongful death action under general maritime
law for deaths occurring in state territorial waters but did not set forth
the scope of the remedies that would be available. 139 Next, the
Eleventh Circuit discussed Mobil Oil Corp. v. Higginbotham,4 ° which

131. Id. at 1319.
132. Id. at 1320. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c).
133. 329 F.3d at 1320.
134. 333 F.3d 1216 (11th Cir. 2003).
135. Id. at 1218.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 1218-19.
138. 398 U.S. 375 (1970).
139. Murphy, 329 F.3d at 1218-20.
140. 436 U.S. 618 (1978).
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held that loss of society damages were not recoverable under the Death
on the High Seas Act ("DOHSA").14 ' The Supreme Court concluded in
Higginbotham that Congress had "'limited survivors to recovery of their
the
pecuniary losses. ' 4' 2 Finally, in Miles v. Apex Marine Corp.,
Supreme Court "addressed whether recovery for loss of society damages
was available for seamen under the Jones Act['"] (based on negligence) and in a general maritime action (based on unseaworthiness)."' 4' In Miles the Court held that "'there is no recovery for loss
of society in a general maritime action for the wrongful death of a Jones
Act seaman. '" 46 Drawing on these three cases, the Eleventh Circuit
in Tucker determined that non-dependent survivors, such as Tucker, of
nonseamen, such as Tucker's son, could not recover loss of society
41
damages in a wrongful death action under general maritime law.
The court noted that "[a] strange anomaly would result if [it] were to
permit the survivors of nonseamen the right to recover loss of society
damages while the survivors of seamen-the traditional wards of
admiralty law-are barred from such recovery under the Jones Act and
general maritime law."' 48

141. Tucker, 333 F.3d at 1218 (citing Higginbotham, 436 U.S. at 618). See 46 U.S.C.
§§ 761-768 (2000).
142. Tucker, 333 F.3d at 1221 (quoting Higginbotham, 436 U.S. at 623).
143. 498 U.S. 19 (1990).
144. 42 U.S.C. app. § 688 (2000).
145. Tucker, 333 F.3d at 1221.
146. Id. (quoting Miles, 498 U.S. at 33).
147. Id. at 1225.
148. Id. at 1222.

